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Disputes over custody and visitation can arise when a marriage ends and one
parent comes out as gay or lesbian. the heterosexual parent may seek custody or
may seek to restrict the activities of the gay or lesbian parent, or the presence of the
parent's same-sex partner, during visitation. A gay or lesbian parent's assertion of
constitutional rights has not been an effective response to such efforts. that is not
likely to change. Advocates for gay and lesbian parents have argued forcefully for a
nexus text, permitting consideration of a parent's sexual orientation only when there
is evidence of an adverse impact on the child. this Essay argues that the nexus test
should be replaced with a rule that disallows consideration of a parent's nonmarital
sexual relationship in custody or visitation disputes. the nexus test implies that
a child might be uniquely harmed because a parent is gay or lesbian or because a
parent has a new unmarried partner. This implication is inappropriate. A court can
evaluate a child's relationship with a significant person a parent has introduced into
the child's life; that evaluation should not turn on whether that person is a spouse or
a nonmarital partner. the court can also examine any decision a parent makes that
causes harm to a child. It is misplaced to articulate a distinct test for scrutinizing a
parent's relationship with a nonmarital partner.
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INTRODUCTION
Constitutional arguments about equal protection or privacy rights, intel-
lectually appealing as they may be, should be... secondary .... A
lesbian mother is very likely to lose if the civil rights of lesbian mothers
in general are allowed to take center stage .... The lesbian mother's
attorney should not assume that the function of the trial is merely to
lay the basis for an appeal on constitutional issues. Regardless of what
the appellate court may think of the constitutional questions, a trial
judge's decision on the facts in a custody dispute is subject to reversal
only for gross abuse of discretion, which is virtually never found.1
So wrote two very recent law school graduates, Nan Hunter2 and myself, in
a 1976 law review article, one of the first ever published on custody and visitation
disputes between a gay and a straight parent after the end of a heterosexual mar-
riage. Over thirty-five years later, I would write the identical words.
Like many in the heady initial days after the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion
in Lawrence v. Texas,3 I thought that case was a game changer. Lofton v. Secretary
of the Department of Children & Family Services,4 a case challenging Florida's ban
on lesbian and gay adoption, had been argued in the Eleventh Circuit before
Lawrence was decided. After that opinion came down, the parties in Lofton filed
supplement briefs. The poetic rhetoric of liberty and freedom in Lawrence was a
bit hard to pin down doctrinally, but in a conversation I had with Nan shortly after
the ruling, we both agreed that whatever it meant, surely gay men and lesbians
could no longer be denied the ability to adopt a child on the basis of their sexual
orientation alone without violating the Constitution. We even thought it might
be harder for a court to use a parent' s sexual relationship as a basis for denying or
restricting custody or visitation.
We were wrong. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Lawrence established no
fundamental right.' It also became one of the first courts to quote Lawrence's
assertion that "[tihe present case does not involve minors '6 and to skew the
1. Nan D. Hunter & Nancy D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers. Legal Theory and
Litigation Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REV. 691, 721 (1976).
2. Nan Hunter became the founding director of the ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project and
went on to a career in academia, in which she has continued to develop legal and constitutional
theories in support of LGBT rights issues. See, e.g., Nan D. Hunter, Living With Lawrence, 88
MINN. L. REv. 1103 (2004).
3. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
4. 358 F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004).
5. Id. at 817.
6. Id. (quoting Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578).
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meaning of that sentence away from the obvious-excluding sex with children
from constitutional protection-and toward an interpretation excluding the claims
of lesbian and gay parents and prospective parents from such protection. In the
past ten years, no lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) parent has suc-
cessfiuly invoked Lawrence in his or her quest to keep custody of a child or block
restrictions on the exercise of visitation rights.7
In fact, when it comes to assertions of constitutional rights, there is great
similarity in outcome between cases from the 1970s, in the wake of Roe v. Wade'
and the other rights-affirming rulings of that era, and those decided in the years
following Lawrence. In both time frames, when a child's heterosexual parent has
challenged the exercise of custody or visitation by a parent who has come out as
gay or lesbian, the gay or lesbian parent's assertion of a constitutional right has
amounted to nothing.9
I illustrate the above point in the next section of this Essay. I then argue that courts
should no longer single out the nonmarital aspect of a parent's new relationship-
gay or straight-when deciding whether to limit a child's exposure to that rela-
tionship. Advocates for lesbian and gay parents have long argued for a nexus test,
banning consideration of a parent's sexual orientation or nonmarital relationship
absent evidence of its adverse impact on the child. Though a court can properly
consider all parental choices that have an adverse impact on a child, it should ignore
all parental choices that do not adversely affect a child. When it comes to a parent's
new relationship, these principles apply no matter what the sex of the new partner
and regardless of whether the couple has married. The nonmarital nature of the
relationship and the gender of the new partner or spouse are irrelevant to de-
7. In an unreported opinion, a trial judge in Missouri relied in part on Lawrence to declare unconsti-
tutional the denial of a foster care license to a lesbian based on her sexual orientation alone. See
Johnston v. Mo. Dep't of Soc. Servs., No. 0516-CV09517, 2006 WL 6903173, at *5 (Mo. Cir. Ct.
Feb. 17, 2006). The state changed its regulations and did not appeal. E.g., Missouri Lifts
Restrictions on Gay Foster Parents, USA TODAY, July 19, 2006, http://usatoday30.usatoday.con/
news/nation/2006-07-19-gayfosterparents x-htm. State constitution-based liberty arguments
have been successfil in Arkansas Department ?fHuman Services v. Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429 (Ark.
2011), which struck down a ban on adoption or foster parenting by any person living with a
nonmarital parmer, and Florida Department of Children &Families v. Adoption fX.X .&NIK .,
45 So. 3d 79 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010), which struck down the country's only remaining ban on
adoption by lesbians and gay men.
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
9. Although popular culture often represents same-sex couples raising children as wealthy white men
raising adopted children or children born of surrogacy, census data demonstrate that the vast
majority of same-sex couples raising children are raising a child who is the biological child or
stepchild of one parmer from a previous heterosexual relationship. Gary J. Gates, Family
Formation and Raising Children Among Same-Sex Couples, FAM. FOCUS, Winter 2011, at Fl. The
subject of this Essay is the possible challenge from the child's other parent.
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termining a child's best interests. A recent California opinion nicely illustrates
this principle.1" And it did not need to cite Lawrence or other constitutional
principles to justify its conclusion.
I. GAY AND LESBIAN PARENTS HAVE NOT WON BY INVOKING
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In In reJ. S. & C.,11 a 1974 NewJersey court cited numerous cases, including
Roe v. Wade, for the privacy rights affording protection to "family relationships"
and "child rearing."12 The court acknowledged that restricting the relationship
between the gay father and his children impeded the father's exercise of those
rights.13 Nonetheless, the court said the case presented "a most sensitive issue
which holds the possibility of inflicting severe mental anguish and detriment on
three innocent children"14 and then restricted the father during his visitation
from having his lover present, living with an unmarried partner, or taking the
child to a location where gay men gathered or participated in any "homosexual
related activities."15
In In rejane B.,16 a 1976 New York court believed that Eisenstadt v. Baird,17
along with some lower court and state rulings, protected consensual sodomy
against criminalization.18 This was something that the court explicitly said pro-
tected "in essence, homosexuality." 19 But, the court continued, these cases did not
extend protection to "children who may be affected physically and emotionally by
close contact with homosexual conduct of adults."2 The court further explained
that it was "not abridging ... fundamental rights or privacy but concerns itself
solely with the well-being of the child and.., whether the ... environment is a
proper one," which the court ruled it was not."
10. See Bauer v. Bauer (In re Marriage of Bauer), No. G043361, 2011 WL 4337093 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2011).
11. 324 A.2d 90 (NJ. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1974).
12. Id. at 93 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 153).
13. Id. at 94.
14. Id. at 97.
15. Id This included prohibiting the father from taking his children to 'The Frehouse," which the court
described as a "meeting hall for homosexuals," as well as to protest marches and rallies. Id at 95.
16. 380 N.Y.S.2d 848 (Sup. Ct. 1976).
17. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
18. In rejaneR, 380 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 857, 860.
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In that case, the court added one sentence that is a hallmark of post-Lawrence
cases. It found, as an issue of fact, that the child was "emotionally disturbed 22
from living with her mother and her mother's partner, thereby purporting to find
a nexus between the mother's relationship and harm to the child. The only evi-
dence to that effect, however, was the testimony of a school psychiatrist who said
the child was living in an "abnormal atmosphere" and concluded the child was
emotionally upset, something he admitted on cross-examination could have been
caused by the divorce itself.23
Post-Lawrence cases usually sound less moralistic than these earlier exam-
ples, but they equally reject constitutional arguments and find it easy to identify
some problem with the children allegedly caused by the parent's relationship. In
Sirney v. Sirney, 24 a 2007 Virginia case, a father with custody of four children filed
an action three years after the separation to restrict the visitation rights of the
mother so that her partner could not spend the night during visitation.2  The
judge granted his request.26 Two of the children, in chambers, expressed some
"discomfort" and "awkwardness" with the mother's relationship, and one said she
preferred time with her mother alone. 2 The judge, restricting the mother from
having any sexual partner overnight at her home when the children were there,
said the case was "not at all" about the mother's lesbian relationship. 2 An oblique
reference in the opinion implies that an expert witness opposed the limitation.29
On appeal, the mother argued that the order violated both equal protection
and her "due process right to make decisions about her private conduct."3 The
appeals court said it deprived her of neither.31 It disposed of the equal protection
claim by pointing out that the restriction applied equally to any heterosexual rela-
tionship.3 2 The court said she was not deprived of her liberty interest because the
decision was based solely on how the children reacted to her relationship, not the
relationship itself.33
22. Id. at 860.
23. Id. at 851-52.
24. No. 0754-07-4,2007 WL 4525274 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 27,2007).
25. Id. at*1.
26. Id. at *2.
27. Id. at *1-2.
28. Id. at *2.
29. See id. at *4 ('[V]hether to accept the testimony of the expert witness was within the purview of the
trial court.").
30. Id.
31. Id. at *5.
32. Id.
33. Id. at*5.
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In McGriffv. McGrff 34 a 2004 case from the Idaho Supreme Court, a
mother filed to modify a joint physical custody order because of the father's same-
sex relationship, a change in circumstances which the trial judge said would
"generate questions from the girls and their friends regarding their Father's
lifestyle," especially given "the conservative culture and morays [sic] in which the
children live."3 The trial court ruled for the mother and granted visitation rights
to the father on the condition that he not live with his partner during the visits.36
The trial judge said the ruling was not based on the father's homosexuality and
cited some factors the mother never raised.37
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court quoted extensively from Lawrence and
said a parent's homosexuality could not be a factor absent a nexus between it and
harm to the child. 3' Nonetheless, it upheld the trial court, accepting without
questioning the judge's statement that the decision did not turn on the father's
homosexuality. 39 The dissenting justice noted how unusual it was to recast a case
brought by the mother for the sole reason that the father was living openly with
his partner into a case about other factors.4" The dissent also pointed out a fact
the majority omitted: The court-appointed custody evaluator, in spite of his reser-
vations about the dynamics between the mother and the father's partner, recom-
mended that the custody arrangement remain unchanged.41
Alabama provides perhaps the most dramatic example of the rejection of
constitutional arguments. In a 2004 case, LA.Mv. B.M.,42 the mother and father
divorced when the child was almost four years old, and the mother had primary
custody for seven years.43 Three years after she began living with her partner, the
remarried father filed for a change in custody.44 The trial judge ruled for the
father.4"
On appeal, the mother invoked Lawrence in the following way: She noted
that in a 1998 case, ExparteJMF, the Alabama Supreme Court approved the
34. 99 P.3d 111 (Idaho 2004).
35. Id. at 117.
36. Id. at 114.
37. Id. at 116-17.
38. Id. at 117.
39. Id. at 118.
40. Id. at 124 (Kidwell, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is unusual and cause for legal concern, that the magistrate
reached for reasons to help [the mother] succeed in her daim when the primary reason stated in her
petition to modify custody, homosexuality, is not a legally permissible consideration.").
41. Id.
42. 906 So. 2d 942 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004).
43. Id. at 943.




transfer of custody from a lesbian mother to a heterosexual father, concluding
that "[w]hile the evidence shows that the mother loves the child and has provided
her with good care, it also shows that she has chosen to expose the child con-
tinuously to a lifestyle that is 'neither legal in this state, nor moral in the eyes of
most of its citizens."'46 The mother in LAM argued that Lawrence effectively
overruledJMF and "expressly confirm[ed] that moral disapproval of homosexual
persons is not a legitimate basis for laws that disadvantage lesbians and gay men."47
The court disagreed, stating that Lawrence was a criminal case, that it did not
overrule JMF, and that this case did not require the court to "address the lawful-
ness of a statute or the morality of homosexuality."48 "Instead," the court con-
tinued, "we must determine whether the evidence presented to the trial court
supports its judgment modifying custody of the child .... We answer that
question in the affirmative."49
Another Alabama case, decided in December 2012, epitomizes the irrel-
evance of Lawrence in that state's law, this time in the context of a mother with a
male romantic partner. In D.MP. C.P. v. TJ C., Jr.,"° apendente lite order gave the
mother temporary custody of a two-year-old child." That order lasted three and
a half years.12 When the final custody hearing took place, the mother was living
with her male fianc6 in the home of her parents.5 3 Also in the home were the
child's two half siblings, the mother's children from her prior marriage. 4
Without factual findings, the trial court awarded custody to the father."5
The appeals court pointed out that Alabama case law allows the trial court
to consider the "moral needs" of the child and the "respective home environments
offered by the parties."6 The mother argued that her sexual conduct should not
be a factor absent evidence of detrimental impact to the child. The appeals court
rejected her argument. It explicitly held that the trial court may, in an initial
46. Id. at 946 (quoting ExparteJVI.F., 730 So. 2d 1190, 1196 (Ala. 1998)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
47. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id.
49. Id. at 946-47.
50. No. 2110700,2012 WL 6554383 (Ala. Civ. App. Dec. 14,2012).
51. Id. at *1.
52. This unusually long time period was the result of the fact hat the husband was charged with
sexually abusing his stepdaughter-the mother's daughter from a prior marriage. The court did




55. Id. at "3.
56. Id. at *7 (quoting Exparte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
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custody determination, "consider a parent's sexual conduct as it relates to that
parent's character, without a showing that the conduct has been detrimental to
the child." 7 The appeals court assumed the trial court had made the findings
necessary to support the judgment and determined that the judgment was not
"plainly and palpably wrong"; therefore, the judgment could not be reversed."
In a 2012 Kentucky case, Maxwell v. Maxwell, a lesbian mother was
successful in overturning a custody award to the heterosexual father, but her ability
to live with her partner remained an issue on remand, thereby demonstrating the
limits of lower court applications of Lawrence.9 In that case, the trial judge gave
custody of three children to their father rather than continue a joint custody order
with their lesbian mother.6" The court order prohibited either parent from living
with a nonmarital partner and said:
The [mother] is seeking to live an unconventional life-style that
has not been fully embraced by society at large regardless of whether or
not same-sex relationships should or should not be considered sexual
misconduct. Like it or not, this decision will impact her children in
ways that she may not have fully considered and most will be unfav-
orable. 6
1
The appellate court reversed the custody determination and remanded, and
it did cite constitutional law: Romer v. Evans62 for the error of singling out the
mother for disparate treatment and Palmore v. Sidoti63 for the error of basing cus-
tody on the private biases of others. 64 But on the subject of the restriction on
living with a nonmarital partner, the court did not cite Lawrence.65 Instead it said
that, while such a factor should not be dispositive on its own, the trial court could
consider it as long as the focus was the children's best interests.66 This is hardly
an affirmation of the mother's right to build a life with her partner.
In Maxwell, as in Sirney and numerous other cases,67 the restriction imposed
limits on the presence of any nonmarital partner as though that rendered the
57. Id.
58. Id. at *8.
59. See Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
60. Id. at 894-95.
61. Id. at 897.
62. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
63. 466 U.S. 429 (1984).
64. Maxvwell, 382 S.W.3d at 898-99.
65. See id. at 900-01.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47, 48 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming enforcement of a
consent decree providing that a lesbian mother could not have "overnight stays with any adult to
whom that party was not legally married or rdated within the second degree"); A.O.V. v. J.R.V.,
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order more acceptable than a ban on a same-sex partner. Arkansas Initiated Act
1, struck down on state constitutional grounds by the Arkansas Supreme Court,68
banned adoption and foster parenting by any person living with a nonmarital part-
ner, a provision that is still the law in Utah.69 Such restrictions allow the con-
versation to be about the superiority of marriage, partially deflecting attention from
the same-sex aspect of a lesbian or gay couple.
II. A COURT CAN EVALUATE A CHILD'S RELATIONSHIP WITH A
PARENT'S NEW PARTNER, BUT WHETHER THE PARENT HAS
MARRIED THAT PARTNER IS IRRELEVANT
The principle that a restriction on visitation is valid only if necessary to further
a child's best interests,70 coupled with the protection that Lawrence should afford
to nonmarital sexual relationships, means that no court should ever make a dis-
tinction between an unmarried partner (same or different sex) and a spouse. An
unreported California opinion gets the reasoning right without citing Lawrence
or any constitutional principle.71 In Bauer, a heterosexual father appealed a re-
striction that denied him overnight visits as long as he remained living with any
nonmarital female partner.72 The order specifically awarded him overnight visits
if he lived alone or lived with a spouse.73 In other words, he would automatically
have overnight visitation if he married the woman he lived with. There was
evidence at trial that the presence of the father's specific partner was detrimental
to the children. "
The appeals court agreed that there was sufficient evidence of detriment,
but it remanded, noting that "if [the father or his partner] were having a detri-
mental effect on the children's welfare during overnight visits, this detriment
Nos. 0219-06-4, 0220-06-4, 2007 WL 581871, at *2, *11 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 2007) (holding
that trial court's visitation restriction prohibiting a gay father from having "any companion with
whom he has a romantic relationship stay overnight (between midnight and 6:00 am.)" was not an
abuse of discretion).
68. SeeArl Dep't of Human Servs. v. Cole, 380 S.W.3d 429,443 (Ark 2011).
69. SeeUTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-6-117(3) (LexisNexis 2008).
70. Alabama appears to be an outlier for allowing a court to consider a parent's nonmarital relationship
without requiring a connection between that relationship and the child's best interests. See supra
notes 42-58 and accompanying text. Other states articulate the need to find such a link, although
in reality that can amount to little more than paying lip service to the existence of such a
connection. See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
71. See Bauer v. Bauer (In re Marriage of Bauer), No. G043361, 2011 WL 4337093 (Cal. Ct. App.
Sept. 16, 2011).
72. Id. at *1.
73. Id. at *8.
74. Id. at *7.
235
60 UCLA L. REv. Disc. 226 (2013)
would not necessarily be remedied by their marriage.""7 On remand, the trial
court needed to "include in the order appropriate factors relating the children's
best interests in fashioning the visitation orders (because [the father's] marital
status alone is not a permissible basis). '"76 In other words, if the partner's presence
was detrimental to the children, then the court could restrict overnight visits in
her presence even if the father married her. What the court could not do was
restrict her presence only for as long as the couple remained unmarried.
This is the proper focus for a court deciding custody or visitation. Losing
this focus could cause a supporter of same-sex marriage to believe that the problem
with the restriction on the presence of a nonmarital partner is that same-sex
couples cannot marry.77 Oddly, the Maxwell court might have thought along
such lines. After remanding the prohibition on the presence of the mother's
nonmarital partner with the instruction that such factor "is not dispositive" and
"must be ascertained with the children's best interests in mind," the court stated
that, "[c]learly, changes in moral standards and the inability of same-sex couples
to legally marry are also relevant."7
If this reasoning implies that the unmarried status of same-sex couples is ir-
relevant only because those couples cannot marry, then that is the wrong approach.
Marriage should always be irrelevant. If a parent's marriage introduces into the
children's lives an adult whose presence is detrimental to their well-being, then
the court can take that into account in deciding custody and visitation. But a mar-
riage should be entitled to no more respect when it comes to the best interests of
children than the relationship a parent has with a nonmarital partner. 79
In Maxwell itself, the appeals court found that "no evidence was provided
that demonstrated the relationship between [the mother and her partner] had any
negative impact on the children."" The two older children testified that they
liked their mother's partner and had no problems with her. 1 It was, therefore,
75. Id. at *S.
76. Id.
77. There is usually a student who makes this argument when these cases are discussed in my classes.
78. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892, 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 2012).
79. In another context, I have decried a distinction that some gay-friendly states are making between
children born to married lesbian couples and those born to unmarried lesbian couples. For example,
in both New York and Massachusetts, a child born to a married lesbian couple has two parents,
while a child born to an unmarried lesbian couple has one-the birth mother. I refer to this as the
"new illegitimacy," and I deplore this development as much as I deplore custody and visitation cases
that impose restrictions on unmarried partners that would never be imposed on a new husband or
wife. See Nancy D. Polikoff, The New "Illegitimacy": Winning BackwEvard in the Protection £f the
Children ofLesbian Couples, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y&L. 721 (2012).
80. Maxwvell, 382 S.W.3d at 899.
81. Id. at 894.
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inappropriate for the court to remand the case to the trial court on the issue of a
ban on the partner's presence. It is impossible to imagine such a ruling concerning
a parent's new spouse.
III. REVISITING THE NEXUS TEST, WHOSE TIME HAS COME AND
GoNE
For many years, going back to the early article I wrote with Nan Hunter,
advocates for lesbian and gay parents argued for a nexus test, prohibiting con-
sideration of a parent's sexual orientation unless it could be shown to have an
adverse impact on the child. 82 This was certainly an improvement over a rule that
a parent living with a same-sex partner was per se an unfit parent,83 or a rule like
that in In re J S. C. and In re Jane B., which presumed adverse impact on the
child.84 But more recent analyses recognize that a parent's sexual orientation
should be irrelevant to custody and visitation.85 This is the preferable rule
because a parent's sexual orientation, in and of itself, can never have an adverse
impact on a child. A parent might not pay sufficient attention to a child's needs
and feelings or might choose a new partner who treats a child poorly. These
could have an adverse impact on the child. But neither has anything to do with
whether the parent is gay or straight, married or not.
It is time to disallow consideration of a parent's nonmarital relationship in
custody and visitation disputes. A court needs a very strong reason to ban someone
from a child's presence, and the nonmarital nature of the relationship should play
no role in such a determination. Certainly the awkwardness and discomfort that
the Sirney children expressed in the presence of their mother's partner, without
more, is insufficient for such a ban.
82. See Hunter & Polikoff, supra note 1, at 714-15 ("[C]ourts ... ought to rule that, until and unless a
nexus is established between lesbianism and its effect on the child, the mother's sexual activity shall
be irrelevant. The nexus itself must be factually specific and concrete. The evidence required to
support such a connection must be definite and relevant to the individuals involved. Speculation
should not suffice.").
83. See Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691, 694 (Va. 1985).
84. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
85. See, e.g., Michael S. Wald, Adults' Sexual Orientation and State Determinations Regarding Placement
of Children, 40 FAM. L.Q 381 (2006). Professor Wald argues that the nexus test "should be
abandoned." Id at 428. He also states that the rule should ban consideration ofsexual orientation,
except in the case of an adolescent who expresses strong wishes not to live with a gay or lesbian
parent. Id. at 431. Even then, this is not a special rule for an older child who does not want to live
with a gay parent. Professor Wald makes clear that an older child should not be forced to live with
any parent whenever this would be painfil or difficult. "[A] special rule in cases involving a gay
parent is inappropriate." Id. at 430.
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A 1998 Maryland opinion provides a clear, unmistakable articulation of the
nexus test in the context of a nonmarital partner:
In all family law disputes involving children, the best interests of
the child standard is always the starting-and ending-point.... When
we narrow the focus to proceedings involving proposed visitation re-
strictions in the presence of non-marital partners, courts also are to
examine whether the child's health and welfare is being harmed. Once
a finding of adverse impact on the child is made, the trial court must
then find a nexus between the child's emotional and/or physical harm
and the contact with the non-marital partner. If no clear, direct con-
nection is found, then the non-custodial parent's visitation rights
cannot be restricted.
... [T]he actual harm and nexus approach we outline today...
applies to both heterosexual and homosexual relationships.... The only
relevance that a parent's sexual conduct or lifestyle has in the context
of a visitation proceeding of this type is where that conduct or lifestyle
is clearly shown to be detrimental to the children's emotional and/or
physical well-being. 86
Even this articulation misses the mark, however, because the nonmarital
character of the relationship is not relevant. If the presence of a parent's new
husband or wife causes "emotional and/or physical harm" to a child, then a court
should restrict that stepparent's presence. And if any decision a parent makes
causes "emotional and/or physical harm" to a child, then a court should make an
order that reduces or eliminates that harm. If another adult in the home of a
parent demeans or abuses a child, the nature of the relationship between the
parent and that other adult is irrelevant; it could be the parent's cousin, sister,
father, or friend. Indeed, if a parent exposes a child to emotional and/or physical
harm from any source, such as placing the child in an after-school activity for
which the child is ill-suited, resulting in feelings of inferiority and low self-
esteem, or employing a babysitter who slaps a child in the face to get him or her to
behave, the court can impose a restriction on the parent's choices.
A distinct rule concerning the presence of a nonmarital partner, even one as
narrowly drawn as that in Maryland, singles out the existence of a nonmarital
relationship as though that factor requires special monitoring by a court. It does
not. The latitude parents have in raising their children should rarely be curtailed,
and one standard should apply to all parental decisions. Just as the nexus test for
sexual orientation implies that a child might be uniquely harmed because a parent
86. Boswellv. Boswell, 721 A2d 662, 678 (Md. 1998).
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is gay or lesbian, the nexus test for the presence of a nonmarital partner implies
that a child might be uniquely harmed because the parent has a new romantic
partner he or she has not married. Neither of these implications is appropriate.
CONCLUSION
In theory, there is a role for Lawrence v. Texas in this critique of any standard
that purports to apply a distinct test to the significance of a parent's nonmarital
sexual relationship. But as the reasoning of Bauer v. Bauer demonstrates, there is
no need to resort to constitutional principles to develop a rule that says a parent's
marital status is irrelevant to the question of whether the presence of a new adult
in the home is detrimental to a child's welfare. Constitutional principles have not
succeeded in the past, and if past is prologue, then that is unlikely to change.
